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I. INTRODUCTION
Comment k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A,1 has
been one of the most widely cited and hotly debated comments of the
1. Comment k, labeled Unavoidably Unsafe Products, states:
There are some products which in the present state of human knowledge
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use. They are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which, not
uncommonly, leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it
is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death,
both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, not-
withstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve.
Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper direc-
tions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of
which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or
under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of
many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients. But such experience
justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding medically
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualifica-
tion that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning
is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability
for the unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he
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20011 PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND STRICT LIABILITY 613
entire Restatement.2 Comment k deals specifically with strict liability
and unavoidably unsafe products, but it has grown to be the comment
most generally associated with prescription drugs. Because of the ex-
ponential increase in both the number and variety of prescription
products, as well as the harmful side effects that often accompany
these new products, comment k has assumed a position of great im-
portance in the evolving law of product liability.
Until recently, Nebraska, along with a relatively small number of
other state jurisdictions, 3 used comment k to provide blanket immu-
nity to prescription drug manufacturers. For over twenty years in
Nebraska, so long as the product had FDA approval and included the
accepted warnings described in section 402A, drug manufacturers in
Nebraska and elsewhere were above reproach for the products they
designed and manufactured.
Abruptly, the days of blanket immunity have ceased with the deci-
sion of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Freeman v. Hoffman La-
Roche, Inc.4 The plaintiff, Freeman, took a prescription drug called
Accutane for two different one-month periods in an effort to treat her
acne. Freeman alleged that as a result of taking Accutane, she devel-
oped several health problems, including colitis, inflammatory polyar-
has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and de-
sirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToaTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
2. See West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Ark. 1991) (adopting rule that
comment k is an affirmative defense requiring proof that drug is unavoidably
dangerous); Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 122-23
(Colo. 1983) (en banc) (providing that the applicability of comment k depends
upon several factors that serve to justify that exemption from strict liability);
Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So .2d 728, 732-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(approving case-by-case application of comment k to prescription drugs); Toner v.
Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 309 (Idaho 1987) (holding that "courts must decide
the applicability of comment k case-by-case"); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795
P.2d 915,924 (Kan. 1990) (same); Pollard v. Ashby, 793 S.W.2d 394, 399-400 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990) (en banc) (same); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah
1991) (asserting that applying the comment k exemption on a case-by-case basis
is a "universally recognized" limitation on the scope of comment k immunity);
Christopher J. Albee & Dawn Kilgallen, Comment, Providing Blanket Comment k
Immunity to All FDA Approved Ethical Drugs: The Defect in Grundberg v.
Upjohn Co., 7 ST. Joms J. LEGAL COMENT. 475, 487 (1991) (noting that there is
wide acceptance of the case-by-case approach to comment k); Tim Moore, Com-
ment, Comment k Immunity to Strict Liability. Should All Prescription Drugs Be
Protected?, 26 Hous. L. REv. 707, 736-37 (1989) (arguing that courts should apply
comment k on a case-by-case basis with the burden of proof shifted to the plaintiff
to prove risks outweigh benefits).
3. States which either currently or in the past have adopted blanket immunity
under comment k include California, Pennsylvania, and Utah. See Brown v. Su-
perior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206,
219-20 (Pa. 1971); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991).
4. 260 Neb. 552, 618 N.W.2d 827 (2000).
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thritis, nodular episclerritis OS, and optic nerve head drusen.5 She
alleged several theories of recovery including negligence, misrepresen-
tation, failure to warn, breach of implied and express warranty, fear of
future product failure, and a strict liability claim that is the focus of
this Note.
Although her claim failed in the trial court, Freeman perfected an
appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court. The court ruled in her favor
on the design defect and fraudulent misrepresentation causes of ac-
tion, and reversed and remanded the case for further hearings pursu-
ant to its new position. In Freeman, the Nebraska Supreme Court
overruled twenty-four years of precedent, co-opting most of the new
standard from the state's general law of products liability. Further-
more, the court declined to adopt either section 6(c) or section 2(b) of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, instead employ-
ing the consumer expectations test6 and retaining comment k as a
case-by-case affirmative defense. 7
By taking this position, the Nebraska Supreme Court created a
body of law that is considerably more plaintiff-friendly, more likely to
trigger adjustments in the practice of law, and more apt to bring about
changes in the way drugs are designed, manufactured, tested, and ap-
proved. Despite this shift, Nebraska maintains a high burden of proof
for any plaintiff attempting to prove strict product liability against a
drug manufacturer.8 This burden, combined with the availability of
the comment k affirmative defense, means that although changes will
certainly occur throughout Nebraska's prescription drug law, the
changes will be moderate and manageable.
This Note analyzes Nebraska's new prescription drug standards
and requirements, as well as the nuances practitioners must become
familiar with to effectively litigate under Freeman. It argues in favor
of the scheme implemented by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Free-
man and asserts that the blanket immunity standard, the risk utility
balancing test (and its accompanying reasonable alternative design
standard), and the proposed standards of both section 6(c) and section
2(b) of the Third Restatement are inappropriate and inferior to the
standard adopted in Freeman.
Part I provides a technical analysis of the law necessary to ex-
amine and understand the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in
5. See id. at 554, 618 N.W.2d at 832.
6. See, e.g., Haag v. Bongers, 256 Neb. 170, 184, 589 N.W.2d 318, 329 (1999) (noting
that under this test, "unreasonably dangerous" means that a product has the pro-
pensity for causing physical harm beyond which would be contemplated by the
ordinary user who purchases it, with ordinary knowledge common to a foresee-
able class of users as to its characteristics.).
7. See Freeman, 260 Neb. at 568, 618 N.W.2d at 840.
8. See id. at 577, 618 N.W.2d at 845-46.
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Freeman. This section examines the foundational tests of the new law
and the criticisms of and alternatives to Nebraska's new scheme. Part
I also supplies working definitions of all the relevant terminology and
applicable standards discussed in this Note as well as in Freeman
itself.
Part II ventures into the body of the Freeman decision to determine
the prudence of such sweeping changes. It explores the process of sift-
ing through all of the available standards to cobble together a rule
that provides the most protection to all interested parties, while al-
lowing for pragmatic implementation of the law handed down in Free-
man. This section agrees with the approach of the Nebraska Supreme
Court and it argues that, while the new standard is not flawless, the
Freeman court made the best of a complex and continuously morphing
body of law.
Part III examines possible rationales behind the court's decision in
Freeman. The Author believes that three factors likely influenced the
timing and result of this judgment: (1) the state of prescription drug
law in other states; (2) the fact that Freeman involved a cosmetic, as
opposed to a therapeutic, drug; and (3) the potential pitfalls of section
6(c). All three factors played a role in the outcome of Freeman, and
the importance of these three factors becomes evident not only when
reading the opinion itself, but also by examining the primary and sec-
ondary sources the Court used to formulate and defend its position.
Part IV explores the potential impact of this decision on both Ne-
braska's legal and social frontiers. From adjusted pleading and proof
requirements for both plaintiffs and defendants, to safer testing mech-
anisms and more attentive doctors, a host of changes loom on the hori-
zon. Part IV disagrees with critics' claims that increased strict
liability for drug manufacturers will cause all of the costs associated
with the production of prescription drugs to explode and the price to
soar, making drugs less available to those who need them the most.
Little evidence supports this claim and any new litigation that results
from Freeman should have a lesser effect on drug prices than either
market-share competition or availability of generic alternatives.
Part V looks to the future of practicing law under Freeman. Law-
yers must realize that to maintain a successful practice, one must con-
stantly adapt to meet new demands. This section explores the nuance
of practicing law, and perhaps medicine, in Nebraska after Freeman,
while offering suggestions to increase firm productivity and client ser-
vice. Innovation and education are key to understanding Nebraska's
new prescription drug law, and this Note aspires to begin part of that
education process.
615
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II. BACKGROUND
A. McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc.
From 1976 to 2000, Nebraska provided all prescription drug manu-
facturers with what scholars and advocates have called "blanket im-
munity" from litigation for defective design. This blanket immunity
was derived from comment k of section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts and was applied to all claims of strict liability against the
manufacturers of prescription drugs. The most widely recognized case
in Nebraska's body of prescription drug law since the adoption of the
Restatement (Second) is McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc.9 In
McDaniel, the Nebraska Supreme Court evaluated a lawsuit stem-
ming from a defective prescription drug.
After being given between two or three doses of a prescription
drug, Innovar, during surgery, Marjorie McDaniel was rendered per-
manently comatose. At the time of McDaniel's surgery, the FDA had
approved the warnings and information contained in Innovar's pack-
age inserts.' 0 McDaniel contended that the defendant manufacturer,
McNeil Laboratories, was negligent in failing to warn, strictly liable
under section 402A of the Restatement (Second), and liable under a
theory of express or implied warranty."1 The trial court submitted the
issue of negligence to the jury but did not submit the claims based on
strict liability or warranty to the jury. On appeal, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court upheld the judge's decision not to submit the strict liabil-
ity claim to the jury, based in large part on the fact that Innovar had
received FDA approval.12
The Nebraska Supreme Court reasoned that since Innovar had re-
ceived FDA approval, it could not be an unavoidably unsafe drug.13
The court went on to cite section 402A of the Restatement (Second) to
determine that Innovar was properly prepared, compounded, pack-
aged, distributed, and included the approved directions and warn-
9. 196 Neb. 190, 241 N.W.2d 822 (1976).
10. To receive FDA approval, prescription drugs are generally required to be distrib-
uted with printed package inserts. The inserts contain "pharmacological infor-
mation, safety evaluations, recommended dosages and administration, and
warnings as to adverse reactions and control measures to be taken in such event."
Id. at 194-95, 241 N.W.2d at 825.
11. See id. at 202, 241 N.W.2d at 829.
12. See id. at 199-204, 241 N.W.2d at 828-30.
13. The court reasoned that:
While approval by the Food and Drug Administration is not necessarily
conclusive, its determinations, based upon the opinions and judgment of
its own experts, should not be subject to challenge in a product liability
case simply because some other experts may differ in their opinions as to
whether a particular drug is reasonably safe, unless there is some proof
of fraud or nondisclosure of relevant information by the manufacturer at
the time of obtaining or retaining such federal approval.
Id. at 199-201, 241 N.W.2d at 828.
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ings.1 4 Additionally, the court classified Innovar as unavoidably
unsafe and, therefore, used comment k to provide blanket immunity to
McNeil Laboratories and to all non-fraudulent prescription drug man-
ufacturers since. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that a drug
could not be defective or unreasonably dangerous without proof of in-
accurate, incomplete, misleading, or fraudulent information furnished
by the manufacturer in connection with the FDA approval process or
later revisions thereof.15
Nebraska, along with a minority of other jurisdictions,16 held that
although FDA approval was not considered conclusive in determining
whether a drug was or was not unreasonably unsafe, FDA experts
should not be subject to second guessing by the courts if the following
two requirements are met: (1) the drug was approved by the FDA; and
(2) it followed the warning guidelines from comment k.17 Innovar was
approved by the FDA and provided the requisite warnings and label-
ing. Consequently, it was not unreasonably unsafe and McNeil Labo-
ratories was immune from liability for defective design. In defense of
this position, courts and scholars suggest that it is in the public's best
interest to allow prescription products which are unavoidably, unrea-
sonably unsafe to be marketed if the benefits of the product justify the
risks.18
The strict liability holding of McDaniel remained virtually unchal-
lenged for almost twenty-five years.' 9 Consequently, Nebraska's body
of strict liability case law since McDaniel remained consistent until
the dramatic changes implemented in the Freeman decision.
B. General Product Liability in Nebraska-the Transition to
Freeman
Although Nebraska did not recognize strict liability for manufac-
turers of prescription drugs until Freeman, since 1987 Nebraska has
enforced strict tort liability for products other than prescription drugs.
In Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co.,20 the Nebraska Supreme Court
recognized three problems or defects that would justify holding a man-
ufacturer strictly liable: a manufacturing defect; a design defect; and a
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See supra note 3 for other states which have adopted the blanket immunity
standard.
17. See McDaniel, 196 Neb. at 201, 241 N.W.2d at 828.
18. See supra note 3.
19. After McDaniel, Nebraska had seen no significant state case law until Freeman.
However, there had been a limited number of federal cases originating in Ne-
braska. See, e.g., U.S. v. Articles of Drug 825 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1987); Groth v.
Sandoz, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 453 (D. Neb. 1984).
20. 226 Neb. 423, 412 N.W.2d 56 (1987).
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failure to warn.21 Additionally, Rahmig established the standard that
Nebraska uses in general strict product litigation and later transposed
to prescription drug litigation. The standard was taken from section
402A, comment i of the Restatement (Second)22 and is commonly
called the consumer expectations test.23
In Rahmig, Nebraska applied the consumer expectations test to
general strict product liability but it did not extend that standard to
prescription drugs and drug manufacturers. Consequently, under
Rahmig, general product liability in Nebraska took a positive step for-
ward, while patients injured taking prescription drugs were left with
little recourse.
III. ANALYSIS
By overruling McDaniel, and declining to adopt the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 6(c) or section 2(b), the Ne-
braska Supreme Court's ruling in Freeman2 4 balanced the twin goals
of providing redress for consumers harmed by defective drugs and en-
suring the continued production and distribution of quality
pharmaceuticals. The result is a standard that encourages and pro-
tects manufacturer innovation yet offers patients and consumers nota-
bly more just results.
A. Technical Analysis of the Freeman Decision
In Freeman, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted a more univer-
sal standard for analyzing the strict liability of prescription drug man-
ufacturers.25 The court began this landmark decision by overruling
McDaniel26 and ended by declining to adopt section 6(c) or section 2(b)
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.2 7 Both prongs
21. See id. at 437-38, 412 N.W.2d at 67 (quoting Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., 215 Neb.
604, 610-11, 340 N.W.2d 369, 373-74 (1983) ("[Tihe notion of a defective product
embraces two separate concepts. The first, commonly labeled a manufacturing
defect, is one in which the product differs from the specifications and plan of the
manufacturer .... The second concept.., is one in which the product meets the
specifications of the manufacturer but the product nonetheless poses an unrea-
sonable risk of danger. This condition is generally characterized as a design
defect.").
22. Comment i of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that the rule in section
402A "applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer... [and is] dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."
23. See supra note 6.
24. 260 Neb. 553, 618 N.W.2d 827 (2000).
25. See supra note 2 for a list of cases adopting the majority position.
26. See Freeman, 260 Neb. at 562-63, 618 N.W.2d at 837.
27. See id. at 567-68, 618 N.W.2d at 840.
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of the court's decision are accurate interpretations of existing law and
precedent and both shall receive equal attention in this Note.
1. New Nebraska Law: Section 402A, Comment k, and the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Since its inception, comment k has been interpreted in a variety of
ways and much disagreement remains regarding its application.
28
However, despite the contention surrounding its application, it is
quite unlikely that the American Law Institute intended it to provide
blanket immunity to all prescription drug manufacturers based solely
on FDA approval. That the majority of jurisdictions currently using
comment k apply it on a case-by-case basis only strengthens this
claim.2 9 These jurisdictions believe that the societal interests in en-
suring the marketing and development of prescription drugs can be
served adequately without providing blanket immunity to
manufacturers.3 0
However, as Nebraska moved away from the blanket immunity of
McDaniel, it added its own twist to the handling of strict liability for
design defect. Rather than adopting a risk-utility balancing test3 1 to
determine liability, Nebraska borrowed from its Rahmig line of
cases 32 and adopted the consumer expectations test 3 3 to determine
strict liability for design defects.
28. See generally, Jeffrey D. Winchester, Note, Section 8(c) of the Proposed Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts.- Is it Really What the Doctor Ordered? 82 CoRNEi.L L. REV.
644 (1997) (discussing comment k and arguing for a "reasonable pharmaceutical
products manufacturer" standard).
29. See supra note 2 for a list of cases.
30. See, e.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993); Hill v.
Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722
P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987); Feld-
man v. Lederle Labs., 479 A-2d 374 (N.J. 1984); Castrigano v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988). A few courts have not specifically adopted
comment k and have instead either fashioned their own rules or treated prescrip-
tion drugs in the same manner as that of all other products. See, e.g., Shanks v.
Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37
(Wis. 1984). See also Thomas V. Van Flein, Prospective Application of the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability in Alaska, 17 ALAsKA L. REv. 1
(2000) (citing cases).
31. "A method of imposing product liability on a manufacturer if the evidence shows
that a reasonable person would conclude that the benefits of a product's particu-
lar design versus the feasibility of an alternative safer design did not outweigh
the dangers inherent in the original design." BLACes LAW DICTIONARY 1329 (7th
ed. 1999).
32. See generally Haag v. Bongers, 256 Neb. 170, 589 N.W.2d 318 (1999).
33. See Freeman, 260 Neb. at 568, 618 N.W.2d at 840 (discussing the requirement
that the plaintiff plead the consumer expectations test in prescription drug
cases).
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a. Working Definitions of Both Tests
Under a consumer expectations test, an "unreasonably dangerous"
product is one that causes harm beyond that which a reasonable con-
sumer (in the expected class of users) would foresee.3 4 Under a risk-
utility balancing test, the fact finder evaluates whether the benefits
provided by the drug outweigh the foreseeable risks associated with
that particular drug.3 5 The benefit or "utility" of the drug may be
small and the risk large, but under the risk-utility balancing test, the
judgment of a health-care provider is often deferred to, and the risk is
deemed acceptable as long as the proper warnings are given to the
doctor or the patient. Based on the functional definitions established
in this section, both tests can now be compared and evaluated.
b. Differences Between the Standards
One main difference between the tests is the placement and nature
of the burden of proof. In jurisdictions that apply the consumer expec-
tations test, the burden of proof on the plaintiff is much more manage-
able.36 A plaintiff is not forced to plead a reasonable alternative
design, but only that the drug in question was unreasonably danger-
ous.3 7 Once that burden is met, the burden of proving that the drug
should be exempted from strict product liability then shifts to the de-
fendant, and a fact finder must determine if comment k will apply as
an affirmative defense.38
Conversely, in most jurisdictions that apply the risk-utility test, a
plaintiff must first plead that the drug has no benefit or utility that
compares to the risk of harm, and then prove that a reasonable alter-
native design is available.39 Because of the added pleading and proof
requirements, the burden on the plaintiff is much greater under the
risk-utility test than under the consumer expectations test.
While it may be beneficial and is permitted, pleading and proving a
reasonable alternative design in a jurisdiction that applies a consumer
expectations test is usually unnecessary. Under a consumer expecta-
tions test, the only determinative question is as follows: What would a
reasonable customer in the position of the injured patient have rea-
34. See Haag, 256 Neb. at 184, 589 N.W.2d at 329. See also supra note 22 (quoting
the Restatement's formulation of the consumer expectations test).
35. See supra note 31.
36. In jurisdictions that apply the consumer expectations test, such as Nebraska, the
plaintiff is not forced to plead or prove a reasonable alternative design. See gen-
erally Rahmig v. Mosly Mach. Co., 226 Neb. 423, 412 N.W.2d 56 (1987). See also
Freeman v. Hoffman La-Roche, 260 Neb. 552, 618 N.W.2d 827 (2000).
37. See supra note 22.
38. See Freeman, 260 Neb. at 568, 618 N.W.2d at 840 (explaining the use of comment
k in Nebraska).
39. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
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sonably expected from the drug? Therefore, adopting the consumer
expectations test to evaluate strict prescription drug liability is a bet-
ter choice for Nebraska because manufacturers are only exempt if
they can prove that the drug they manufactured is unavoidably, un-
reasonably dangerous. Plaintiffs still have to prove that the actions of
the manufacturer fell below the applicable standards, but, in Ne-
braska, that is now a more manageable burden.
2. Application of Section 6(c) and Section 2(b) to Prescription
Drugs
The following is a technical exploration of the applicability of sec-
tion 6(c) and section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) to strict liability
for prescription drugs.
a. Section 6(c)
Much criticism has been generated regarding section 6(c) of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.40 Section 6, entitled
Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by De-
fective Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices, states as follows in
subsection (c):
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective
design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are
sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that rea-
sonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and thera-
peutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of
patients.
4 1
Section 6(c) suggests a net-benefit test for prescription drug strict
liability.42 Comment b explains that although the Reporters do not
believe that drug manufacturers should have carte blanche when it
comes to drugs with FDA approval, section 6(c) does propose that
manufacturers should be given a large amount of discretion in mar-
keting pharmaceuticals. 4 3 Judging by the standard proposed in sec-
tion 6(c) and the comments that follow, the Reporters appeared to
believe that abrogating a strict standard and giving manufacturers in-
40. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Concious Design Liability for Prescrip-
tion Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard versus a Negligence Standard, 63
GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 76, 95-103 (1994).
41. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiAmIUTY § 6(c) (1998).
42. See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1101 (2000); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiABILrry § 6(c) cmt. f (1998) (describing the test
proposed in section 6(c) in terms of a net-benefit test).
43. "At the same time, manufacturers must have ample discretion to develop useful
drugs and devices without subjecting their design decisions to the ordinary test
applicable to products generally under § 2(b)." RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LiABILrrY § 6(c) cmt. b (1998).
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creased discretion would allow drug manufacturers greater freedom to
develop and market new drugs.44 Although this is a powerful theory,
the validity of the argument is severely limited when applied to practi-
cal situations.
For example, comment f,45 generally called the "reasonable physi-
cian" standard, has no practical application because it is overly com-
plicated, rigid, and scarcely offers any relief or protection to patients.
Under this standard, the issue in a design defect claim is whether,
objectively viewed, a reasonable physician knowing the foreseeable
risks and benefits of a particular drug would prescribe it for any class
of patients. Liability is imposed only in the unusual situation such
that no reasonable physician would prescribe the drug for any reason
to any class of patients.4 6
Later in the Note, the criticisms of section 6(c) will be discussed at
length.47 For now, knowing that from a purely technical standpoint
section 6(c) proposes a net-benefit test and incorporates the 'reasona-
ble physician' standard is enough.
b. Section 2(b)
Section 2, Categories of Product Defect, states the following rule
regarding strict liability for design defect:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inade-
quate instructions or warnings. A product:
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative de-
sign renders the product not reasonably safe.
4 8
Section 2(b) was specifically intended to deal with general product
liability and was not designed to deal with prescription drugs.49 How-
ever, because section 2(b) is discussed briefly in Freeman5 O and has
been proposed as an alternative to both section 402A and section
44. See id.
45. "However when a drug or device provides net benefits to no class of patients,
when reasonable, informed health-care providers would not prescribe it to any
class of patients, then the design of the product is defective and the manufacturer
should be subject to liability for the harm caused." Id. at comment f.
46. See id.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 70-83.
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABrLiTY § 2(b) (1998).
49. In fact, the Reporters discuss the differences between section 2(b) and section 6(c)
in comment b of section 6 and note that the standard in section 2(b) was not
intended for, and is too broad to address, the particular features of prescription
drug litigation.
50. See Freeman, 260 Neb. at 567-569, 618 N.W.2d at 840-841.
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6(c),51 it warrants a short technical explanation in this section, with a
more detailed analysis to follow.5 2
Section 2(b) is the section of the Third Restatement that deals with
general strict product liability.53 Similar to the net-benefit test in sec-
tion 6(c), it proposes a risk-utility balancing test for determining lia-
bility. Section 2(b), however, does not include the reasonable
physician standard contained in section 6(c), but instead proposes a
more universal standard for determining liability, that of "reasonable
alternative design."5 4
In several regards, the approach of section 2(b) resembles the way
a majority of jurisdictions currently implement section 402A of the
Second Restatement.5 5 Section 2(b) is distinguishable from Ne-
braska's method for handling prescription drug strict liability by the
absence of the comment k affirmative defense. In section 2(b), the
burden of proving a reasonable alternative design is placed on the
plaintiff, essentially serving the same purpose as the comment k af-
firmative defense portion of Nebraska's scheme. If there is no safer
alternative available, then the drug is unavoidably unreasonably un-
safe and there is no liability. However, section 2(b) places the burden
of proof on the plaintiff rather than on the defendant and, therefore,
creates an unnecessarily arduous process for plaintiffs.
B. Freeman Was an Insightful Decision
The Nebraska court made a wise decision to break with McDaniel
for two reasons: (1) the blanket immunity McDaniel created was inef-
fective in protecting patients and created patently unjust results;56
and (2) the new standard promotes increased protection of patients,
the manufacture of safer products, and continued innovation by drug
companies, all without forcing manufacturing and litigation costs to
skyrocket.57
Demonstrating a willingness to re-evaluate long-standing law, the
Nebraska Supreme Court crafted a standard and application that in-
corporated the needs and rights of all affected parties. Consequently,
51. See, e.g., Conk, supra note 42.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
53. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIm) OF TORT: PRODUCTS LiABrry § 2(b) cmt. a
(1998) (explaining section's applicability).
54. Id. at § 2(b).
55. See Conk, supra note 42, at 1094-98 (explaining that the majority ofjurisdictions
apply section 402A using a risk-utility balancing test accompanied by pleading a
reasonable alternative design by the plaintiff to determine strict products liabil-
ity for prescription drugs).
56. See generally Cupp, supra note 40, 96-97 (criticizing the results that would ac-
company the adoption of section 6(c) as the standard as well as its inflexible
nature).
57. See id.
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the design defect portion of the Freeman holding is not only an accu-
rate statement of the applicable law and a positive step in the protec-
tion of consumers and patients, but a decision which encourages the
manufacture and distribution of experimental drugs.
1. McDaniel to Freeman-Righting a Wrong
The law, as established in McDaniel, was both an inaccurate appli-
cation of comment k and incapable of providing legitimate protection
to patients. Under McDaniel, drug companies had nearly complete
immunity from strict liability, in tort, for design defects.58 As long as
a drug was approved by the FDA, prepared properly, and accompanied
by the required directions and warnings, the drug was neither defec-
tive nor unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law.5 9
This use of comment k left patients like Maijorie McDaniel with
limited legal recourse when they were injured by a prescription drug.
To prove liability, McDaniel had to prove that the manufacturer of the
drug fraudulently mislead the FDA.60 In jurisdictions like Nebraska,
plaintiffs lost time and time again on any strict liability claim against
drug manufacturers, 61 and had little hope of proving strict liability in
prescription drug cases (until, of course, Freeman).
The intended and appropriate application of comment k is, and has
been for some time, hotly contested by scholars.6 2 Although comment
k seeks to encourage innovation by providing protection for manufac-
turers of products like prescription drugs, nowhere is it expressly
stated that all prescription drug manufacturers should be given blan-
ket immunity from strict liability. Rather, a common sense interpre-
tation leads a reader to the same conclusions that the Nebraska
Supreme Court made in Freeman when it decided to adopt comment k
as a case-by-case affirmative defense. 63
Jurisdictions that adopt comment k as a case-by-case affirmative
defense do not drastically reduce the protection they offer to manufac-
turers. They simply shift the burden of proof to defendants and re-
58. See text accompanying notes 9-18.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). Both Brown and the
extensive line of cases in California to follow it, are examples of what happens to
plaintiffs under a system like McDaniel.
62. In fact, comment k is generally the most consistently debated comment to section
402A. See, e.g., Ian Birkett, Arkansas Adopts Comment k as an Affirmative De-
fense in Prescription Drug Actions, 14 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 199 (1991)
(dissecting the adoption of comment k in Arkansas); Thomas M. Moore and Scott
L. Hengesbach, Comment k." A Prescription for the Over-the-Counter Drug Indus-
try, 22 PAc. L.J. 43 (1990) (arguing that all over-the-counter drugs should be ex-
empted from strict liability).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 9-18.
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quire them to prove that the product is unavoidably, unreasonably
unsafe to avert liability. The protection of comment k remains availa-
ble to all prescription drug manufacturers. The difference between
McDaniel and Freeman is the shift from blanket immunity sans fraud
by the manufacturer, to earned immunity when deserved and justi-
fied. By re-interpreting comment k and subsequently shifting the bur-
den of proof to defendants, the Nebraska Supreme Court created a
more useful system predicated on a more accurate reading of the law.
2. Freeman: A More Precise and Protective Standard
Nebraska's adoption of a new standard for strict prescription drug
liability adequately and accurately achieves the goals of prescription
drug law. Because drug manufacturing is a profit driven business, the
possibility of increased strict liability encourages exploration of new
and better methods for testing and design of products. 64 It is no
longer safe for manufacturers to feel content that the benefit of a drug
they manufacture is comparable to the risks it creates and therefore
exempts them from strict liability.6 5 Instead, drug companies now
have to be convinced that there is no reasonable, safer, alternative
design before marketing a drug, which can only lead to safer, healthier
patients.
Critics of strict liability for prescription drugs have cited increased
costs associated with verdicts, litigation costs, settlements, and more
expensive testing programs as reasons to avoid enforcing strict liabil-
ity against drug manufacturers. While increased costs could serve as
a deterrent to the adoption of a tougher standard, the cost of new tests
or judgements against drug manufacturers can be spread out over
each prescription making the cost increase negligible when compared
with the results.6 6 Not only will patients get better drugs under Ne-
braska's new standard, but the drugs will be safer since drug compa-
nies should be persuaded to take more time and greater precautions in
the development process to avoid potential liability.
Additionally, drug companies will continue to search for new cures
and medicines. If the drug is new, it is likely that there are few known
risks, only known benefits. As long as the manufacturer warns the
doctor or patient of any known foreseeable risks, the chances of manu-
64. See Conk, supra note 42, at 1131 (allying critic's fears of increased cost and de-
creased experimentation by detailing the potential for increased safety through
strict liability litigation).
65. See RESTATEMENT (TaM) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABarri § 6(c) cmt. k (1998) (dis-
cussing Pasteur's rabies vaccination as an example of a medicine that has fore-
seeable risks but is still quite useful).
66. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, CASES AND MATERALS ON TORTS 745 (1995) (detail-
ing cost minimization as a positive result of and a reason for promoting strict
liability).
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facturers being held strictly liable for new innovations is not likely,
given the availability of the comment k affirmative defense. Since
manufacturers are not facing any consequential rise in exposure for
new drugs, innovation will continue under Freeman.
Accompanying these benefits is the realization that the new stan-
dard will give back to the courts some of the discretion they lost under
McDaniel.6 7 Although the FDA might be the regulatory body most
able to test the design and nature of a drug, their process is not flaw-
less. 68 All regulatory agencies make mistakes or receive errant test
results. It is important to realize that there is a second buffer zone
between prescription drugs and the public. Because of the Nebraska
Supreme Court's holding in Freeman, the courts can now be such a
zone for Nebraska. In fact, one could argue that litigation regarding
prescription drugs is, and should be, part of the process and must be
allowed to further ensure the safety of patients.6 9
For those still wary of strict liability for prescription drug manu-
facturers, it bears noting that even though it took several substantial
steps, the Freeman court's ruling does not guarantee the success of all
strict liability claims against drug manufacturers. In Nebraska,
plaintiffs must still overcome a demanding burden of proof, because
the comment k affirmative defense will ferret out bogus claims. Free-
man merely returns to the courts some of the discretion absent for the
twenty-five years since McDaniel and it should lead to more just re-
sults for both parties.
Whether attributable to McDaniel's shortcomings, the realization
that the FDA cannot be the sole protector of patients, or the belief that
Nebraska's prescription drug law was outdated and lacking, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court saw fit to make a change. Freeman is not only
legally accurate, but is focused on ensuring just results for both pa-
tients and manufacturers. These substantial benefits make it clear
that the court was correct to overrule the blanket immunity of
McDaniel.
3. Not Too Much, Not Too Little, but Just Right
The court was able to make Freeman sufficiently narrow by: (1)
declining to adopt section 6(c); and (2) not stretching the doctrine of
section 2(b) beyond its intended use. Although no other state court
had faced this question at the time Freeman was decided, 70 the court
steered Nebraska's tort law in a positive direction without creating an
67. See generally Cupp, supra note 40, at 81-88 (criticizing the loss of some of the
courts' discretion in jurisdictions that apply comment k blanket immunity).
68. See id. at 104-05 (advocating and discussing the benefits of litigation as a secon-
dary precaution to an overworked, underfunded FDA).
69. See id.
70. See Freeman, 260 Neb. at 565, 618 N.W.2d at 838.
[Vol. 80:611
2001] PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND STRICT LIABILITY 627
overly broad, untenable position. Declining to adopt section 6(c) and
section 2(b) was central to this decision. Further examination of the
problems with section 6(c) and section 2(b) demonstrate why the Ne-
braska Supreme Court was correct not to adopt either as law.
Adopting section 6(c) has several obvious drawbacks.71 The follow-
ing discussion of the four general limitations of the proposed law will
detail why the Nebraska Supreme Court was justified in declining to
adopt section 6(c).72
a. Section 6(c) Does Not Accurately Restate the Law
Section 6(c) does not restate the law as it is, but instead attempts
to make new law.73 First, section 6(c) proposes an inflexible, overly
complicated standard for evaluating design defects. The "reasonable
physician" standard allows strict liability for prescription drugs only
when no reasonable physician would prescribe the product because it
is not useful to any class of persons. The majority of jurisdictions do
not advocate and have not adopted this as the standard and, conse-
quently, it does not serve as a restatement or clarification of the law.
Rather, most jurisdictions apply some version of risk-utility balancing
to determine strict liability for design defect in prescription drugs.74
These jurisdictions use a variety of factors to determine liability and
often require the plaintiff to plead and prove a reasonable alternative
design.75 Section 6(c) merely offers a hypothetical solution that fails
71. See generally, Richard L. Cupp, Jr., The Continuing Search for Proper Perspec-
tive: Whose Reasonableness Should Be at Issue in a Prescription Product Design
Defect Analysis?, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 233 (1999); Teresa Moran Schwartz,
Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TUNN. L. REV.
1357 (1994); Michael J. Wagner and Laura L. Peterson, The New Restatement
(Third) of Torts-Shelter from the Product Liability Storm for Pharmaceutical
Companies and Medical Device Manufacturers? 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225 (1998).
72. This discussion is by no means all-encompassing, but rather focus on the glaring
defects of section 6(c). For a more exhaustive examination, see Conk, supra note
42.
73. The court in Freeman v. Hoffman La-Roche, Inc., 260 Neb. 552, 565-566, 618
N.W.2d 827, 839 (2000), stated
[There is no support in the case law for the application of a reasonable
physician standard .... Rather ... the majority of courts apply some
form of risk-utility balancing that focuses on a variety of factors .... The
few cases that the Third Restatement cites to as support for the reasona-
ble physician test also apply a risk-utility test. Thus, section 6(c) does
not restate the law and instead seeks to formulate new law with no prec-
edential support.
74. Even jurisdictions that may not conform to the majority do not apply the "reason-
able physician" standard. Instead, they apply either a test like McDaniel, Free-
man, or a risk-utility balancing test with the reasonable alternative design
standard.
75. See Freeman, 260 Neb. at 562,618 N.W.2d at 837 (discussing the method of appli-
cation and factors used in other jurisdictions' risk-utility test, and explaining why
Nebraska rejects that test).
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to clarify strict product liability for design defect regarding prescrip-
tion drugs, in effect muddling the issues as opposed to helping courts
manage the changing legal landscape of prescription drug litigation.
Instead of representing the current state of prescription drug lia-
bility, or restating the law as it is, section 6(c) proposes sweeping
changes with no basis in law. Not surprisingly, the Reporters them-
selves did not believe that the standard proposed in section 6(c) would
be widely accepted for that very reason.7 6 Rather, the Reporters in-
tended to create a new standard, which they quite notably accom-
plished. Unfortunately, the section as drafted does little to simplify or
articulate the law of strict liability for prescription drugs and, conse-
quently, is of little practical use.
b. The Reasonable Physician-an Unreasonable Standard
Another criticism of section 6(c) is the nature and proposed appli-
cation of the reasonable physician standard.77 The reasonable physi-
cian standard is a demanding objective standard, less concerned with
the actions of individual doctors or the safety of actual patients, and
more concerned with what a "reasonable physician" would do. In fact,
comment f of section 6 goes so far as to assert that while evidence
regarding the conduct of the actual health-care provider is relevant
and admissible, it is not controlling.78 According to the Reporter's
notes, the issue before a fact finder is whether a reasonable provider,
aware of the foreseeable risks and benefits of a drug, would prescribe
it for any class of patients.79 Consequently, as one commentator
noted, there is no need for fact finders with any critical thinking
skills.S0 Rather, fact finders will be required to evaluate expert testi-
mony and decide based solely on the opinion of those experts. It mat-
ters not what a jury or judge believes is reasonable, or even what a
given community believes is reasonable; it only matters what an ex-
pert says a "reasonable physician" would do, no matter how absurd.
76. Reporter James Henderson acknowledged that, although the new Restatement
will "bring clarity," it is quite possible that courts will not accept it in whole or
part. In 1993 he stated: "I believe the Restatement will have normative force.
The prestige of the American Law Institute will give it weight. However, I doubt
that every court will adopt it. I do not think it will meet the reception of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, which was an idea whose time had
come." James Henderson, Revising Section 402A. The Limits of Torts as Social
Insurance, 10 TouRo. L. REv. 107, 108 (1993).
77. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable physician
standard).
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. f (1998).
79. See id.
80. See generally, Donald E. Kacmar, The Impact of Computerized Medical Literature
Databases on Medical Malpractice Litigation: Time for another Hellig v. Carey
Wake-up Call?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 617, 631-635 (1997).
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Consequently, the Nebraska Supreme Court was justified in re-
jecting section 6(c) as its standard for prescription drug liability be-
cause the "reasonable physician" standard is impractical, allows little,
if any, discretion on the part of fact finders, and does nothing to im-
prove the plight of patients. The Nebraska court made the best of a
complex body of law in deciding to evaluate each claim on a case-by-
case basis, ensuring more just results.
c. Cosmetic vs. Therapeutic
Another difficulty facing jurisdictions choosing to adopt section 6(c)
is that the test in section 6(c) treats all drugs, no matter what their
utility, similarly. Nowhere are the problems with this proposition
more evident than in a case like Freeman. Accutane, the drug Free-
man alleged was defectively designed, is an oral medication designed
to treat acne. While clear skin may be important to a large percentage
of people, very few people would equate a medication that cures acne
with the types of chemotherapy designed to fight cancer. While not
ideal, side effects from a drug that can save lives may be tolerable if
there is no safer alternative. Conversely, serious side effects from a
cosmetic drug such as Accutane are unacceptable.8 1 Under section
6(c), both the drugs used in chemotherapy and the cosmetic drug
would be exempted from liability because both drugs could benefit a
certain class of people and would, therefore, pass the "reasonable phy-
sician" test.
In contrast, under the new Nebraska standard, if the drug is more
dangerous than a reasonable consumer with ordinary knowledge
would reasonably expect, enforcing strict liability against the manu-
facturer is possible. Since plaintiffs have a more effective remedy
available, there will be more pressure on manufacturers to comply
with the new standard, and patient safety should continue to increase.
Although Freeman increases patient remedies, Nebraska's new
standard still promotes the development of new drugs. Generally,
when a prescription drug is new, no alternatives exist, let alone safer
alternatives. Consequently, a manufacturer would rarely, if ever, be
held liable, absent fraud or deception, for a new or experimental drug,
especially if it is a potentially life-saving drug. Only if the drug is
avoidably, unreasonably unsafe and the manufacturer's actions fall
below acceptable standards will courts in Nebraska be able to impose
strict liability. Accordingly, because section 6(c) does not make any
allowance for the differing usefulness of prescription drugs, and be-
cause the Freeman court was able to craft a simpler and more flexible
81. In a March 28, 1998 edition of the Lancet, there was a discussion of the FDA's
reaction to Hoffman La-Roche's questionable advertising in light of Acutane's
known side effects. THE LANCET, Mar. 28, 1998.
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standard, the Nebraska Supreme Court acted in the best interests of
fairness when it declined to adopt section 6(c).
d. Ease of Claim Dismissal
Strict liability under section 6(c) is virtually impossible to ade-
quately prove, and plaintiffs would find getting beyond summary judg-
ment, let alone succeeding at trial, an inherently unattainable goal.
The relative ease with which a consumer's claim could be defeated is
perhaps the most obvious reason that Nebraska decided to reject sec-
tion 6(c). 8 2
For example, if the standard in section 6(c) were applied to a strict
liability claim like Freeman's, Freeman would have lost. To prevail,
Hoffman La-Roche (the manufacturer of Accutane) would only have
needed to produce evidence of the countless known prescriptions still
being written for Accutane. Since doctors all across the country still
prescribe Accutane daily, despite the foreseeable and known risks, the
reasonable physician test is passed, and Freeman would have no rem-
edy in strict liability. Patients would have no real solution and drug
companies would have no incentive to change, defeating the original
goals of strict product liability.83
Furthermore, on the rare occasion that a claim for strict prescrip-
tion drug liability gets beyond the summary judgement stage, under
section 6(c) the fact finder is not allowed to give any weight to the
availability of other, less harmful drugs which may be just as effective.
Judges or juries are not allowed to decide what an "ordinary con-
sumer" should have expected as reasonable side effects to the drug
taken. Rather, they must rely solely on the word of an expert testify-
ing to what a reasonable physician would do. This is a sinister design
because the fate of the plaintiff rests solely in the hands of an expert,
often a professional witness. Reaching a just decision is made more
difficult and arriving at a clearly refined and articulated body of law is
nearly impossible.
Based on the enumerated flaws in section 6(c), the Nebraska Su-
preme Court crafted a thoughtful opinion and was able to balance the
interests of all involved when it chose to reject section 6(c). Section
6(c) does not accurately restate the law, the reasonable physician test
is artificial and unreasonable, the usefulness of the drug is not bal-
anced against its utility, and plaintiffs will very infrequently stand a
chance of meeting such a high burden. Consequently, section 6(c) did
not become a component of prescription drug law in Nebraska.
82. Commentators have noted several additional problems with section 6(c). See gen-
erally Cupp, supra note 40, at 88; Conk, supra note 42, at 1088-90.
83. See generally Epstein, supra note 66, at 728-47.
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4. 2(b) or Not 2(b)
After explaining its reasons for declining to adopt section 6(c), the
Nebraska Supreme Court briefly discussed the relevance of section
2(b) to prescription drug law. The court quickly dismissed the applica-
bility of section 2(b) because it was crafted for general products liabil-
ity and the parties in the case did not address it as an alternative to
McDaniel, section 402A, or section 6(c).84 This segment of the Note
will more thoroughly examine the application of section 2(b) to deter-
mine its place in prescription drug litigation.
Despite the suggestion of at least one author that section 2(b) can
be used as an alternative to section 6(c),8 5 Nebraska chose not to
adopt section 2(b) to serve as its guide to prescription drugs. In re-
sponse to any claim that section 2(b) should be applied to prescription
drugs, one must start with the Third Restatement itself. Comment b
of section 6 states that section 2(b) does not apply to prescription
drugs and medical devices because the standard in section 2(b) is a
less rigorous standard than section 6(c).S6 Although proposing a less
rigorous standard than section 6(c) is not necessarily a negative,
credence must be given to the fact that the Reporters themselves did
not believe section 2(b) was capable of evaluating prescription drugs.
More important to Nebraska's courts and attorneys than the Re-
porter's view of section 2(b) is the standard and burden of proof pro-
posed. Similar to the net-benefit test in section 6(c), section 2(b)
proposes a risk-utility balancing test for determining strict liability.87
One distinct difference between section 2(b) and section 6(c) is that in
place of the reasonable physician standard, section 2(b) proposes a
more universal standard for determining liability: that of reasonable
alternative design.SS Thus, the approach of section 2(b) is quite simi-
lar to that of the majority of jurisdictions currently implementing sec-
tion 402A of the Second Restatement.8 9 In Freeman, Nebraska
rejected both the risk-utility balancing test and the reasonable alter-
native design standard, and consequently, maintained consistency by
in rejecting the adoption of section 2(b) as Nebraska's prescription
drug model for the same reasons.9 0
84. See Freeman, 260 Neb. at 568, 618 N.W.2d at 840.
85. See generally Conk, supra note 42 (proposing section 2(b) as a better standard for
prescription drugs than section 6(c)).
86. See RESTATEAMNT (THIR) oF ToRrs: PRODuCTs LIABmrry § 6(c) cmt. b (1998).
87. See id. at § 2(b).
88. See id.
89. See generally Conk, supra note 42, 1094-96 (examining how the majority ofjuris-
diction apply section 402A and comment k to claims of prescription drug strict
liability).
90. See Freeman, 206 Neb. at 568, 618 N.W.2d at 840.
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Based on the shifted and increased burden of pleading and proof on
the plaintiff, the loss of comment k as an affirmative defense, and the
fact that the drafters never intended section 2(b) for use on prescrip-
tion drugs, the Nebraska Supreme Court was justified in declining to
adopt section 2(b) as the test for prescription drug strict liability. The
resulting law is more reasonable, allows courts more discretion, and
more aggressively protects the rights of patients while not impeding
innovation. Additionally, if strict liability is to continue evolving, the
law must strike a balance between no liability for manufacturers and
no justice for patients. With its ruling in Freeman, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court determined the course of prescription drug liability in
Nebraska and articulated such a balance.
C. Possible Reasons for the Court's Decision
Several possible reasons exist for the Nebraska Supreme Court's
decision to overrule McDaniel and not adopt section 6(c) or section 2(b)
of the Third Restatement: (1) the state of the law in other jurisdic-
tions;9 ' (2) the fact that Freeman involved a cosmetic drug that was
avoidably, unreasonably dangerous; and (3) the fact that section 6(c)
has so many potential pitfalls.92 One such reason alone may not have
been enough to overrule twenty-four years of precedent, but the com-
bination of all three pieces made the Nebraska Supreme Court's deci-
sion landmark, and dramatically transformed Nebraska's position on
strict liability for prescription drugs.
Although all three elements were substantial conditions, two of the
three elements cannot be underestimated. The type of drug involved
in Freeman combined with the nature of strict liability for prescription
drugs in most other jurisdictions, presumably swayed the Nebraska
court as much, or more, than any other element of this decision. No
doubt, the court felt pressure to conform its laws with that of the ma-
jority of jurisdictions, especially since patients and plaintiffs were be-
ing treated unjustly under McDaniel. Even if Nebraska was not
planning to adopt the same prescription drug standards as other juris-
dictions, Nebraska's body of prescription drug law was in desperate
need of updating.
The awareness that Nebraska prescription drug law needed an
overhaul to better protect patients combined with the chance to shape
new law without wrestling with the complications presented by a less
cosmetic, more therapeutic drug, provided the ideal setting for a such
a decisive break with McDaniel. These two significant factors, com-
bined with the sub-standard nature of section 6(c), led the court to
91. See generally, Cupp, supra note 40 (organizing jurisdictions into three general
categories by how each handles prescription drug strict liability).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 70-83.
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break with old law and introduce a more universally recognized and
considerably more just standard for prescription drug liability.
D. Projections of the Future Social and Legal Impact of
Freeman
Because the Nebraska court adopted the consumer expectations
test and the doctrine of the learned intermediary,9 3 several social and
legal changes are foreseeable. Among the projected changes are the
way pleadings are constructed, the way the elements are presented,
the pretrial and out-of-court duties of attorneys, and the several social
ramifications of this landmark decision.
1. Legal
By adopting a new standard for prescription drug strict liability
cases in Freeman and overruling the blanket immunity for drug man-
ufacturers provided by McDaniel, Nebraska potentially opened its
courts up to a flood of litigation. Some critics point to the missing
requirement of the reasonable alternative design "buffer" against in-
creased litigation as a serious flaw in Nebraska's scheme. These crit-
ics argue that by not forcing the plaintiff to plead a reasonable
alternative design, liability is determined solely by what a reasonable
consumer should have expected, not by what is actually possible. The
result these critics fear, is a situation in which every cause of action
could reach the trial phase. Consequently, critics caution, the cost of
litigation could skyrocket because of the extra time and resources
spent defending frivolous claims under the consumer expectations
standard.
A closer examination of the Freeman decision exposes the weak-
nesses of these criticisms. By allowing comment k to function as an
affirmative defense for manufacturers, there may be a small increase
in the numbers of claims that reach trial, but there should be no dis-
cernable elevation in litigation costs. 94 Even if more claims progress
beyond the summary judgment phase, the actual number of cases in
which liability is imposed would not increase greatly, because the
buffer critics have clamored for is directly under their collective noses,
albeit in a slightly different configuration.
The use of comment k as an affirmative defense allows the ques-
tion of the availability of a reasonable alternative to be presented to a
fact finder. However, it places the burden of pleading and proof on the
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LiABiLrIT § 6(d) (1998) (outlining
what triggers the learned intermediary doctrine and describing its role in the
Third Restatement).
94. See Conk, supra note 42 (providing statistics that support a claim that litigation
costs will not greatly increase with the shift Nebraska made).
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defendant and forces a manufacturer, intending to avoid strict liabil-
ity, to explain to a jury why the drug is unavoidably, unreasonably
unsafe. No portion of the risk-utility balancing test or the reasonable
alternative design test is lost under the consumer expectations test.
Rather, under recent Nebraska law, the burden of proving that a drug
is unavoidably, unreasonably unsafe is shifted to the defendant, which
is the most logical place for this particular burden. After all, manufac-
turers are in the best position to know of the availability of a reasona-
ble alternative, 95 and defendants are in the most effective position to
prevent the harm caused to the patients.
Moreover, in Freeman, Nebraska returned to the roots of strict lia-
bility: corrective justice.96 The goal of corrective justice is to place the
loss incurred on the party who created the condition, as opposed to
placing an undue burden on the party who suffered from that condi-
tion.97 The defendant's drug "caused"98 the harm and the manufac-
turers are the experts on the drug that caused the harm. Therefore, to
escape liability, the defendant should be the party forced to prove that
no safer alternative was available at the time of the manufacturing of
the drug.
Furthermore, by forcing the manufacturer to plead and prove that
comment k should apply to its particular product, litigation costs may
decrease because manufacturers will have more incentive to design,
manufacture, and market safer drugs. If a manufacturer knows that
there is a reasonable alternative available, it essentially is faced with
two alternatives: (1) either switch production to mirror that of the
safer alternative before distribution;9 9 or (2) continue to manufacture
products in the same 'dangerous' manner, knowing that liability is
probable.100 In either scenario, no discernable upsurge in money or
time spent litigating cases will occur, while the potential for increased
patient safety and just results increases greatly. Considering these
reasons, it seems clear that the Nebraska court was correct in adopt-
95. Based on the expertise from the design and manufacture of a drug, and the inti-
mate knowledge that accompanies this process, manufacturers know more than
patients, plaintiffs, and possibly some doctors.
96. See Epstein, supra note 66, at 746 (explaining the concept of corrective justice
and the role it plays in strict liability).
97. See id. at 746-47.
98. Throughout this paragraph, "caused" is to be interpreted in the loosest sense, as
in led to or contributed, but not as in fault.
99. If a manufacturer switches design to meet the safer possibility before hand, then
it will likely not become a defendant because there will be no litigation related to
that drug.
100. If there is no change in the design of the drug when a claim arises, defendant
manufacturers will probably settle early, knowing that they would likely lose at
trial because a safer alternative is available.
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ing comment k as a buffer to liability under a consumer expectations
test.1oi
2. Social
Coupled with the possible legal ramifications of the Freeman deci-
sion, several social changes may spring from the new Nebraska law.
The Freeman decision may lead to: (1) better warnings and testing by
drug companies; (2) more awareness on the part of doctors regarding a
drug's side-effects and the availability of alternative drugs; and (3)
fewer patient injuries. Though not inevitable, if even one of the dis-
cussed social changes occurs, it would be another feather in the cap of
the Freeman court.
a. Better Warnings and Testing
When operating a business, the bottom line is the bottom line. In-
vestment in pharmaceutical companies is generally a very secure ven-
ture.10 2 The preceding statement is not intended to suggest that a
healthy bottom line should be held against drug companies, or any
other companies for that matter. In fact, many scholars have argued
that capitalistic competition for market-share often drives businesses
to make better, cheaper, and safer products.10 3
However, just as automobile and general product litigation have
forced manufacturers to provide safer products and better warnings,
so too, can prescription drug litigation force manufacturers to be more
precise. Hitting a company in its pocketbook is one of the most effec-
tive ways to institute change, and even a few million-dollar settle-
ments could cause a company to alter its business practices.i0 4
Higher litigation costs coupled with increased market-share competi-
tion will likely trigger positive changes in testing measures employed
by prescription drug manufacturers.
Opponents of increased liability for drug manufacturers cling to
the idea that forcing more safety testing and allowing more litigation
will lead to astronomical increases in the cost of prescription drugs.
These critics express concern that few citizens will be able to afford
101. Other potential legal changes may occur when the court is faced with a cause of
action involving a less cosmetic, more therapeutic drug. The Freeman standard
appears to be solid, but the court may be forced to re-evaluate its position when
such a claim arises.
102. Even during a time of recession lasting over a year, the biotech and drug industry
is still the number one rated stock, per return on investment, on several websites.
103. This is a strong point, and generally easy to accept as true. However, realizing
that prescription drug companies are profit driven and attempt to capture large
portions of the market share only bolsters the argument that the only way to get
them to take notice is to make them pay.
104. This Note is certainly not advocating obscene damage awards, and neither does
that seem to be the goal of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Freeman.
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the newer, safer, more expensive drugs. However, such concerns are
both unreasonable and unfounded. By examining the results of strict
liability in the automobile industry, one can see that a balance be-
tween consumer wants and needs versus product price and safety is
possible.
When discussing safety versus affordability and utility, cars have
had the most analogous development pattern to that of prescription
drugs. In automobiles, there are two extremes possible in the frame
and body of a car. At one end of the spectrum is a car with a plastic
frame and an open, fiberglass body. Such a vehicle would be remarka-
bly inexpensive, very convenient, notably efficient in fuel consump-
tion, but extremely dangerous to passengers and drivers. On the
other end of the safety continuum is a vehicle with a steel cage and
roll-bars for a frame, and thick, steel, unibody panels. This distinc-
tive, tank-like car would be almost impenetrable during normal driv-
ing use, but it would guzzle gas and be prohibitively expensive to
purchase.
One alternative that meets the needs and demands of both con-
sumers and manufacturers is a car with a steel frame and thin com-
posite aluminum and steel panels. Cars like this are lighter, more
convenient, and less expensive than the tank, but substantially safer
than the plastic and fiberglass option. Add airbags and shoulder har-
ness seatbelts and the safety increases even more with very little ad-
ded cost. This analogy proves that balancing safety with efficiency
and cost effectiveness is quite possible.
Yet another example of this type of balance becomes clear upon
examination of John Winger's plight.l05 John has terrible allergies,
but substandard insurance and average means. His choice spectrum
includes the options of taking no medication and suffering greatly, but
saving seventy-five dollars a month, or taking the drug that alleviates
his allergy symptoms completely with no notable side-effects, but fore-
going other essentials, like food, to afford it. Neither is a viable solu-
tion for John, so he must find a balance.
Enter the fifteen dollar per month alternative drug. Although not
quite as effective as the seventy-five dollar a month medication, it is
considerably more effective than taking nothing. John gets a safe
drug that controls his allergies without having to sacrifice the rent
payment to be allergy free. A balance such as Winger's is not only
possible, but probable under Freeman, given the negative alternatives
of patient injury or increased litigation costs that would result from no
sustainable equilibrium. Based on the history of strict product liabil-
ity in Nebraska, it is conceivable that consumer demands, combined
105. Based on a true story. Names have been changed to protect the innocent.
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with regulation of new prices and increased marketplace competition,
will lead to safer, yet affordable, drugs.
b. More Aware and Attentive Doctors
Patients and consumers should be hopeful that the pressure on
drug companies will lead health-care workers to be more aware of the
provided warnings and side-effects of the drugs they prescribe. Be-
cause of this potential liability, physicians will likely become more de-
liberate when they prescribe medication and, therefore, make better
advocates for their patients.
The threat of potential liability may also help reverse the ongoing
trend of doctors spending less and less time with individual patients.
With the adoption of the learned intermediary doctrine, it will be in a
doctor's best interest to know as much as possible about each patient,
since a miscalculation from lack of familiarity can end a doctor's prac-
tice and a patient's life. Doctors who are potentially strictly liable for
failure to warn patients will perhaps be more attentive to drug litera-
ture and available, alternative treatments.
Likewise, doctors will receive more warnings and information de-
tailing side-effects from drug manufacturers before they begin pre-
scribing a drug. By completely and accurately informing a physician
of the potential dangers and side effects of a drug, manufacturers can
be exempted from liability for failure to warn the patient under the
learned intermediary doctrine.1 0 6 Doctors should be able to make
more informed decisions based on increased information, resulting in
fewer instances of careless prescriptions.
This increase in pressure should force drug manufacturers to cre-
ate safer products.lOT After all, if a drug is unsafe, large numbers of
doctors will not prescribe it. Fewer prescriptions mean less money
and, as discussed earlier, affecting the profit margin of any company
or the livelihood of health-care professionals is the way to initiate
change. These adjustments in procedure and policy will help curb the
106. See, e.g., Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 1970)
(stating that a manufacturer's failure to warn the medical community of the risks
involved with a drug vicariously breached the manufacturer's legal duty to the
patient); Presto v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 487 S.E.2d 70, 73 (Ga. App. 1998) (hold-
ing that manufacturer of prescription anti-psychotic drug had no duty to directly
warn the patient of risks of discontinuing use of the drug); Doe v. Alpha Thera-
peutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d 404, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming that the learned
intermediary defense protected the manufacturer of blood products which were
contaminated with HIV from failure to warn claims); McEwen v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974) (stating that the manufacturer is directly
liable to the patient for a breach of its duty to warn the patient).
107. One can only assume that doctors choosing between two equally effective drugs
will usually choose the safer of the two to prescribe for a patient.
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senseless injuries and deaths that result from avoidably, unreasona-
bly dangerous drugs and inadequate warnings.
E. Life After Freeman-What Lawyers Should Expect
Freeman will have a marked effect on Nebraska's attorneys. Law-
yers on both sides will have several new responsibilities and opportu-
nities in offering proper representation to their clients.
1. Plaintiffs' Attorneys
a. Pleading and Proof
The Nebraska Supreme Court established a new procedure for
pleading a maintainable cause of action for strict liability based on
design 08 defect of a prescription drug. A plaintiff must now plead
that the drug was unreasonably dangerous under a consumer expecta-
tions test.10 9 Additionally, any pleading alleging a warning defect
must satisfy the requirements of the learned intermediary doc-
trine.11o This departure from pleading under McDaniel requires at-
torneys to be aware of the subtle and not so subtle differences that the
Nebraska Supreme Court adopted in Freeman.
Likewise, the burden of proof in Freeman is lower for plaintiffs
than it was in McDaniel, and liability becomes more that just theoreti-
cally possible. By adopting comment k as a case-by-case affirmative
defense, the court created a standard that is more plaintiff-friendly
than the previous blanket immunity of McDaniel. If pled correctly, a
claim now has a considerably better chance of surviving summary
judgment and patients enjoy more likelihood of recovering for harm
caused by defective, prescription drugs.
b. The Effect of the Learned Intermediary
In addition to the pleading requirements for making a claim
against the manufacturer, plaintiffs' attorneys must also be aware of
the requirements and consequences of the doctrine of the learned in-
termediary."'l If the manufacturer adequately warned the health-
care provider, then a cause of action for strict liability against a manu-
108. Although not discussed in this Note, the Freeman court discussed and articulated
new law regarding causes of action alleging manufacturing defects as well. See
Freeman, 260 Neb. at 569, 618 N.W.2d at 841.
109. See id. at 568, 618 N.W.2d at 840 (discussing the incorporation of the consumer-
expectations text into Nebraska's body of law on strict liability for manufacturers
of prescription drugs).
110. "We also adopt the learned intermediary doctrine as reflected in section 6(d) of
the Third Restatement as the test to be applied when considering whether a
warning defect exists in a prescription drug." Id. at 577, 618 N.W.2d at 845-846.
111. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998) (explaining
learned intermediary doctrine).
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facturer will not survive a defense motion for summary judgment. Not
only should plaintiffs' lawyers know whether or not the doctor was
adequately warned by the manufacturer before suing on failure to
warn, but plaintiffs' attorneys should consider suing doctors who fail
to warn their patients adequately. Doctors are presumed to be more
knowledgeable about a drug than their patients and are expected to be
advocates of their patients' best interests. By holding doctors account-
able for the drugs they prescribe, courts can protect patients while
increasing the potential for better warnings and inserts accompanying
all prescription drugs.
c. The Focus of the Litigation
Patients no longer have to prove fraud by the drug manufacturer to
enforce strict liability.112 From expert and witness testimony to open-
ing and closing statements to depositions and interrogatories, the fo-
cus for plaintiffs' attorneys must change. An attorney's time and
energy should be directed primarily at proving that the drug in ques-
tion was avoidably, unreasonably unsafe, based on the expectations of
an ordinary consumer with ordinary knowledge.
Although proving the availability of a reasonable alternative de-
sign can bolster the claim that a product was unreasonably dangerous,
it is not necessary and might cloud the minds of the jury. Instead of
straying from the new burden of proof established in Freeman, plain-
tiffs' attorneys should let manufacturers spend time and money at-
tempting to convince the jury that the drug is unavoidably,
unreasonably dangerous. By concentrating on the pleading require-
ments of Freeman, plaintiffs' attorneys will not only conserve re-
sources, but will not make any part of defendants' cases for them.
2. Defense Attorneys
The key to surviving the changes implemented by the Nebraska
court in Freeman is proactive client management. Instead of waiting
until litigation arises and then trying to defend against it, defense at-
torneys should seek out potential problems and defuse them before
they explode. Education can be a huge time and money saver for both
clients and attorneys.
a. Lawyers Representing Manufacturers
Whether it means hiring new lawyers with the requisite education
and medical background, or contracting with other similar specialists,
a firm must be able to adapt to the new demands Freeman has cre-
ated. Meeting with clients to explain the law and the ways to avoid
liability before a problem arises may be the best possible solution for
112. See supra text accompanying notes 25-39.
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defense lawyers and their clients. By educating clients, defense attor-
neys are working to avoid the need to litigate prescription drug cases.
Given the more plaintiff-friendly nature of the pleading and proof re-
quirements set forth in Freeman, avoiding litigation would be ideal for
defense attorneys and manufacturers alike.113
Defense lawyers and their clients can benefit from an "education
first" approach to the Freeman decision in three main ways. First, by
potentially saving the client millions of settlement dollars as well as
the negative press that accompanies such cases, a defense attorney
provides an invaluable service, thereby ensuring grateful clients. Al-
though litigation costs per client may increase slightly as the new
standard is implemented, a potential decrease in litigation and settle-
ment costs is foreseeable for a manufacturer who is educated in the
law. By focusing on the client's long-term goals and bottom line, de-
fense attorneys can provide the best possible service for their clients
as well as saving the client money in the long run.
Second, as other non-client manufacturers get wind of firms with
new "proactive" and "cost-effective" methods and policies, the possibil-
ity of increasing the firm's client base soars. Non-client manufactur-
ers, concerned with both public image and operating costs, will jump
at the opportunity to save money and produce better products. A firm
with a thorough understanding of the law handed down in Freeman
and a program in place to convey that knowledge to a manufacturer,
positions itself to benefit immensely from this change in Nebraska
law.
Finally, billable hours per client should not change dramatically
because clients can be billed for the time it takes to explain the new
law and discuss preventative measures. This reality makes education
even more of an incentive. Additionally, clients will save money on
large litigation or settlements, even if budgeted per year litigation ex-
penses do not immediately decrease. Therefore, firms that demon-
strate an ability to adapt to the changes in prescription drug law will
not only benefit as a firm, but can work wonders for their clients.
In addition to the chance to save patient lives and prevent serious
injury, educating clients can have nothing but a positive effect on the
bar and the prescription drug industry. Clients will be more satisfied
with a firm's performance, manufacturers can save money on avoided
litigation and settlements, a firm's client base can grow exponentially,
and the firm's income should not decrease dramatically and may actu-
ally grow-all thanks to the development and institution of an educa-
113. Although the court in Freeman eliminated blanket immunity for manufacturers
and shifted the burden of proving the availability, or lack thereof, on the defen-
dant, litigation by no means will be a "slam dunk" for plaintiffs. The availability
of comment k as an affirmative defense affords defendants a legitimate chance to
avoid liability.
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ion program in response to the Nebraska Supreme Court's holding in
Freeman.
b. The Workload: Not More, Just Shifted
After learning about some of the new challenges that will be facing
defense attorneys, it may seem as if the workload has increased
greatly; however, that is not the case.11 4 Rather, the attorney work-
load has shifted, requiring more hands-on work with the client to pre-
vent litigation, and more time spent explaining to clients the need to:
1. Provide accurate warnings, both on products and directly to
doctors. Such warnings can insulate the manufacturer from liability
for failure to adequately warn.
2. Test all products thoroughly before marketing and document
the method used and results of the tests. Drug companies can no
longer assume that FDA approval is a "get out of jail free" card. Since
comment k applies only on a case by case basis, the need for testing
and re-testing of drugs before marketing is more important than ever.
3. Bring possible "dangerous" or "questionable" drugs and side-
effects to the attention of an attorney to determine the potential liabil-
ity of marketing the drug as is.
Likewise, for firms or lawyers that represent doctors and health
care professionals, the job description has been altered. By meeting
with clients individually or collectively and explaining what the new
law is, what it means to them, and how to avoid liability and protect
patients while still turning a profit, clients save money and heartache,
and the earning potential of smart, forward-thinking firms and attor-
neys will increase.
A defense attorney must meet with the doctors and explain the
need for them to do the following:
1. They must be selective in the types of drugs they prescribe. A
health-care professional should not rely on the FDA or drug company's
literature exclusively. Rather, they should know everything from the
side effects, to interaction warnings, to what other doctors say about
all drugs prescribed to any particular patient. This knowledge can not
only alert doctors to potential health hazards for their patients, but
help prevent potential career-ending liability.
2. They must read the warnings provided and explain what these
warnings mean to patients. By reading and accurately conveying the
meaning of all associated warnings, doctors not only help insulate
114. However, for those looking forward to more work or more litigation, it is still
quite possible. Several scholars have argued that one reason to avoid the ap-
proach Nebraska has taken is an increase of litigation costs. See generally Conk,
supra note 42. No matter which side one is on, it is easy to see that, possibly with
established education program, and probably without one, there will be more liti-
gation resulting from Freeman.
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themselves from liability, but they protect patients from injury and
the manufacturer from liability for failure to warn.
3. They must have a nurse or other appropriate employee present
when explaining warnings and potential side effects. Although it will
likely not be determinative in the mind of a jury, if litigation arises,
having another witness to testify on behalf of the client is definitely an
asset.
4. They must have patients sign a sheet, prepared by the firm,
that confirms that the doctor explained the side effects and potential
risks to the patient. This paper is not necessarily intended to absolve
the doctor of fault, or to even be legally binding, but it is a way to
make sure a patient is listening, and could have value as circumstan-
tial evidence at trial. Not all patients will agree to sign it, which is
why it is of increased importance to have a nurse or other appropriate
employee present during the warning process.
3. Innovation-The Linchpin of a Successful Practice
Although Freeman dramatically changed the playing field, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court created a detailed blueprint that adequately
serves both plaintiffs and defendants. To astute entrepreneurs, the
new law creates a chance to distinguish themselves through innova-
tive litigation techniques and client management. Plaintiffs have a
realistic chance of proving strict liability against drug manufacturers,
but their attorneys must be well-versed in the new law. Conversely,
defense attorneys have an excellent opportunity to carve out a bigger,
more successful piece of the proverbial pie by taking a proactive ap-
proach to the changes adopted in Freeman. Opportunity is knock-
ing-who is going to answer?
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Nebraska Supreme Court had to wade though
twenty-four years of history and an immense assemblage of different
standards, it was able to create a system that offered the best combi-
nation of results for all those affected by prescription drug litigation.
The Freeman court was justified in overruling McDaniel and declining
to adopt section 6(c) or section 2(b) of the Third Restatement. In Free-
man the goals of the law of design defect for prescription drugs, both
current and proposed, were balanced with the reality and demands of
a product-driven society. Although the result is more of a beacon than
a definitive, all-encompassing answer, the result is a standard and an
application that encourages innovation, yet protects patients, consum-
ers, and drug companies.
James Beckmann
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